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Abstract
We study the complexity of the destructive bribery problem—an external
agent tries to prevent a disliked candidate from winning by bribery actions—
in voting over combinatorial domains, where the set of candidates is the
Cartesian product of several issues. This problem is related to the concept
of the margin of victory of an election which constitutes a measure of ro-
bustness of the election outcome and plays an important role in the context
of electronic voting. In our setting, voters have conditional preferences over
assignments to these issues, modelled by CP-nets. We settle the complexity
of all combinations of this problem based on distinctions of four voting rules,
five cost schemes, three bribery actions, weighted and unweighted voters, as
well as the negative and the non-negative scenario. We show that almost
all of these cases are NP-complete or NP-hard for weighted votes while ap-
proximately half of the cases can be solved in polynomial time for unweighted
votes.
1 Introduction
Voting in an election is a common procedure to aggregate the preferences of the
parties involved, the voters, over a set of alternatives, the candidates, in order to
find one or more winning alternatives. In many settings, the set of candidates is
the Cartesian product of several issues. One might think of a referendum, where
voters have to approve or disapprove of each issue, or the individual configuration
of a product consisting of several components for each of which several options can
be chosen, such as a car where the consumer can choose between different options
for the model, equipment, color, and various other features, or a computer where
different options are available for the operation system, hardware and software
components. The number of possible candidates (available choices, outcomes)
is hence exponential in the number of issues or components, and it may be an
∗Supported by DFG grant TO 200/3-1.
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impossible task for voters to express their preferences over the whole set of available
choices by ranking them all.
Additionally, voters might have conditional preferences over the candidates.
The typical example is a meal consisting of several components, such as a main
dish (fish or meat), a side dish (chips or rice), and a drink (beer or wine). A voter
might (unconditionally) prefer meat to fish, and he might prefer wine to beer given
that fish is served for the main dish. In the car example, a consumer might prefer
a station wagon to a hatchback, and he might prefer a black car to a white one,
but only if it is equipped with an air conditioning system.
In view of applications such as e-commerce and other settings on the web
and internet where one has to deal with very large populations, one is interested
in a compact description and efficient communication and aggregation of these
conditional preferences in combinatorial domains. One approach is given by CP-
nets, a graphical model introduced by Boutilier et al. [1] that incorporates ceteris
paribus (cp) statements describing the conditional dependencies. Preference ag-
gregation in CP-nets was studied by Rossi et al. [24] and various other authors
(e.g., [22, 27, 5]).
Besides the problem of determining a winner, a central topic in the computa-
tional social choice literature is the study of the computational complexity of vot-
ing problems such as strategic voting (manipulation), election control and bribery
([3, 9]). In the bribery problem, initially introduced by Faliszewski et al. [11] (see
also [10, 12, 8]), voters can be bribed to change their preferences. In the construc-
tive bribery problem, one asks whether a briber can make his favorite candidate
win the election with these changes, subject to a budget constraint.
Mattei et al. [19] considered several procedures for determining a winner in
voting with CP-nets and investigated the bribery problem in this context. They
introduced and adapted several natural cost schemes for the bribery problem in
the setting of CP-nets and determined the computational complexity of the prob-
lem under the various voting rules and cost schemes, also considering the level
of dependency the briber can affect with his changes. In most of these cases,
they obtained that the bribery problem is solvable in polynomial time. Dorn and
Krüger [7] answered open cases and considered the weighted and negative versions
of the problem. Further investigations of bribery in CP-nets deal with interaction
and influence among voters [18] and with representation of the voters’ preferences
via soft constraints [21].
In this work, we study the complexity of the destructive bribery problem in
CP-nets, which asks whether a disliked candidate can be prevented from winning
the election by bribery actions. The study of destructive bribery is also related to
the concept of the margin of victory ([17, 26, 23]) of an election. Given a voting
rule and a set of votes, the margin of victory is the minimum number of votes
that must be modified in order to change the winner(s) of the election. If the
voting rule selects a unique winner, then the problem of deciding whether this
number is larger than a given threshold corresponds to the destructive bribery
problem introduced by Faliszewski et al. [11]. The margin of victory is a measure
of robustness of the outcome of an election, specifying the number of errors that
may occur in an election—be it due to inference or due to fraud—without having
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an effect on the outcome. It is of particular interest in the setting of electronic
voting where post-election audits are executed to verify the correctness of the
electronical record ([20]). An audit samples ballots and measures the discrepancy
of the sampled electronic votes with respect to their paper record. Risk-limiting
post-election audits seek to minimize the size of the audit when the outcome is
correct ([25]). The margin of victory is an important parameter used to determine
the size of an audit for this method.
We study all combinations of voting rules, cost schemes, and bribery actions
considered by Mattei et al. [19], as well as weighted voters and the negative
scenario. The destructive variant has been investigated in various voting prob-
lems [4, 6, 14], including bribery [12] without combinatorial domains. In all these
settings, for the unique-winner case, the destructive version is at most as hard
as the constructive one. We think that our work might be interesting for several
reasons: First, in our setting, destructive bribery turns out to be harder than con-
structive bribery in many cases. Second, the problems we use for our reductions
(two variants of the Satisfiability problem and the Knapsack problem) are
not the typical ones that are often used in the context of voting problems. An
overview of our results is given in Table 1 on page 7.
2 Preliminaries
Almost all our notations and definitions can be found in greater detail and ex-
emplified in the articles by Mattei et al. [19] and by Dorn and Krüger [7], who
analyzed the constructive case of the same scenario.
This section is structured as follows. First, we present the NP-complete prob-
lems we use for our reductions. Afterwards we define CP-nets and introduce
related notation. This is followed by the introduction of the voting rules we will
work with. We are then ready to define the bribery problem in the setting of CP-
nets and introduce the different cost schemes and allowed bribery actions. Finally,
we give an overview (Table 1) of the results obtained in this paper and close this
section with an example.
For our reductions we use the following NP-complete problems.
(Not-All-Equal) 3-Satisfiability, (NAE-)3SAT [13]
Given: A set U of n variables νi, collection C of m clauses over U
such that each clause γ ∈ C is a subset of U with |γ| = 3.
Question: Is there a truth assignment for U such that each clause in
C has at least one true (and one false) literal?
Knapsack [13]
Given: A set U of n objects (wi, vi) ∈ N
2 of weight wi ∈ N and value
vi ∈ N, positive integers k, b ∈ N.
Question: Is there a subset U ′ ⊆ U of objects with total weight at
most b and total value at least k?
CP-nets In our setting, we are given a set of m issues M = {X1, . . . ,Xm}, and
each Xi ∈ M has a binary domain D(Xi) = {xi, xi}. A complete assignment
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to all issues is called a candidate, so there are 2m different candidates. Each of
the n voters has (possibly) conditional preferences over the values assigned to the
issues; if the preference of an issue X depends on one or more other issues (called
the parents Pa(X)), we call this issue dependent, and independent otherwise. For-
mally, a CP-net is defined by a directed graph (with the issues as its vertices and
directed edges going from Pa(X) to X) modeling these dependencies, and a ta-
ble for each issue, containing the preference over the assignment to this issue for
each different complete assignment to its parents; each combination of an assign-
ment to the parents and the corresponding preference over the issue is called a
cp-statement. For example, for a CP-net with issues X and Y , the cp-statement
x > x means that the assignment X = x is unconditionally preferred to X = x,
while the statements x : y > y and x : y > y express that the assignment Y = y is
only preferred to Y = y in the case that X = x (hence, Pa(Y ) = {X} here). The
collection of CP-nets of all voters is called a profile.
CP-nets only define a partial order over the candidates, i.e., some candidates
are incomparable. One way to expand this to strict total orders over the candidates
is to give a strict total order over all issues such that no issue depends on any issue
following it in this order. If the same order O works out for all CP-nets of a profile,
the profile is called O-legal [16].
Throughout this work, we assume that the voters’ preferences on the set of
issues are given by compact (the number of parents of each issue is bounded by
a constant) and acyclic (the corresponding graph is acyclic) CP-nets. For acyclic
CP-nets, the most preferred candidate of a voter can be determined efficiently [1].
An example of a profile consisting of three CP-nets is given in Table 2 at the
end of this section. The CP-nets encode conditional preferences for the alternative
options of a menu consisting of a main dish, a side dish and a drink. Alice’s choice
for the drink is dependent of the choice for the main dish: She prefers beer to wine
in case meat is served, and wine to beer if fish is served as a main dish.
Voting A voting rule maps a profile to a set of candidates. With One-Step-
k-Approval (OK), only the k most preferred candidates of each voter obtain
1 point each. The winner of the election is the candidate with the most points
(or all candidates with those points). In particular, we consider the special cases
One-Step-Plurality (OP ), where k = 1, and One-Step-Veto (OV ), where
k = 2m − 1. With Sequential majority (SM), given a total order O for which
the profile is O-legal, we follow this order issue by issue, and execute a majority
vote for each issue. The voters fix the winning value of the corresponding issue
in their CP-net and then go on to the next issue. The winning candidate is the
combination of the winners of the individual steps taken. These rules are also used
by Mattei et al. [19].
Interestingly, it is NP-hard to determine the winner for the voting rule One-
Step-k-Approval (OK) if k is part of the input. Therefore, we restrict our analysis
to efficient cases of OK where k has a value which is polynomial in n and m or for
O-legal profiles where k is a power of 2. We denote these cases by OKeff. Here, the
winner can be determined in polynomial time using results by Brafman et al. [2,
Theorem 9] and Mattei et al. [19, Lemma 1]:
4
1. If k is polynomial in n and m, then by a result of Brafman et al. [2, Theorem
9], for a given acyclic CP-net, an order of the issues, and a candidate, it is
possible to find the next best candidate in polynomial time. Hence, for every
voter, we can list the candidates ranked on the first k positions in polynomial
time and output the candidate with the maximum score.
2. For k = 2j with j ∈ N and a global order of the issues, Mattei et al. [19,
Lemma 1] state that only the first m − j issues are relevant and, more
drastically, the last j issues can be removed because each voter can only
rearrange the first 2j candidates with changes in his CP-net. So all of these
candidates are the same on the first m−j issues and cover all possible values
for the last j issues while all of them get a vote. 1
For the general case, Theorem 1 proves NP-hardness for just evaluating a
given voting-scheme. In the rest of this work we will focus on OKeff instead of
OK.
Theorem 1. It is NP-hard to determine the winner of a given profile when using
the voting rule One-Step-k-Approval with arbitrary k of polynomial size in n and
m (i.e., exponential value).
Proof. We reduce 3SAT on m clauses and n variables to an OK-election with m
voters, n issues and k = 7 · 2n−3. So given a formula F on variables ν1, . . . , νn and
clauses γ1, . . . , γm we introduce for each variable νi the issue Xi. For each clause
γ containing the variables νi, νj , νℓ, we create one voter ordering the issues by
(Xi > Xj > Xℓ > Xˆ \ {Xi,Xj ,Xk}) with Xˆ being the set of all issues. This voter
prefers the three issues in a way such that the two non-satisfying combinations
are on the last position (regarding only these three issues). The assignment and
order of the last n− 3 issues is not relevant. Therefore the voter votes for the first
7 · 2n−3 candidates which exactly corresponds to all candidates with a satisfying
combination for the clause γ (no matter what the rest of the issues are set to).
Now a winner of the election obtains m votes if and only if F is satisfiable.
Bribery We consider the problem that an external agent, the briber, who knows
the CP-nets of all voters, asks them to execute changes in their cp-statements.
We distinguish the cases that the briber can ask for a change in cp-statements of
independent issues only (IV ), dependent issues only (DV ), or in all (IV +DV )
issues [19]. We consider the following five cost schemes [19]:
• Cequal: Any amount of change in a single CP-net has the same unit cost.
• Cflip: The cost of changing a CP-net is the total number of individual cp-
statements that must be flipped to obtain the desired change.
• Clevel: The cost of a bribery is computed
2 as
∑
Xj∈M ′
(k + 1 − level(Xj)),
where M ′ ⊆ M is the set of bribed issues for this voter, k is the number of
1We note that while it is not possible to explicitly list all winners in this case, we can output
the set of winners with the use of “don’t care” wildcards for the last j issues in polynomial space
2The formula given here differs from the one of Mattei et al. [19]. See the argument of Dorn
and Krüger [7, Remark 1] why both are equivalent.
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levels in the CP-net, and level(Xj) corresponds to the depth of issue Xj in
the dependency graph. More precisely,
level(Xj) =
{
1 if Xj is an independent issue
i+ 1 else, with i = max{level(Xk) | Xk is a parent of Xj}.
• Cany: The cost is the sum of the flips, each weighted by a specific cost.
• Cdist: This cost scheme requires a fixed order of the issues for each voter
(not necessarily the same for each of them), inducing a strict total order over
all candidates. The cost to bribe a voter to make c his top candidate is the
number of candidates which are better ranked than c in this order.
Additionally, these cost schemes are extended by a cost vector Q ∈ (N)n for an
individual cost factor for each voter. The factor for voter vi is denoted by Q[i]
and is multiplied with the costs calculated by the used cost scheme to obtain the
amount that the briber has to pay to bribe vi.
The destructive (D,A,C)-bribery problem is then defined in the following way:
(D,A,C)-Destructive-Bribery (DB)
Given: A profile of n CP-nets over m common binary issues, a winner
determination voting rule D ∈ {SM,OP,OV,OKeff}, a cost scheme
C ∈ {Cequal, Cflip, Clevel, Cany, Cdist}, a bribery action A ∈ {IV,DV,
IV + DV }, a cost vector Q ∈ (N)n, a budget β ∈ N, and a disliked
(‘hated’) candidate h. With SM , we also require O-legality for one
common order and with Cdist, and OK
eff up to n given total orders
over the issues.
Question: Is it possible to change the cp-statements of the voters
such that the candidate h is not in the set of winners of the bribed
election, without exceeding β?
We also consider Weighted-(D,A,C)-DB, which is defined in the same way,
but with weighted voters, which is a typical variant for bribery problems (see the
overview of Faliszewski et al. [11]).
Moreover, we also consider weighted and unweighted (D,A,C)-negative-DB.
The notion of negative bribery was introduced by Faliszewski et al. [11] for the
constructive case (to make a candidate win the election) in order to cover a more
inconspicuous way of bribery: the briber wants to make his preferred candidate p
win by not bribing any voter to vote directly for p, therefore just redistributing
the votes for the other candidates through bribery. For the destructive case we
consider in this work, the analogue restriction is to prohibit bribing voters to vote
against the disliked candidate if they have not done so before (recall that with
OK and OV , a voter votes for several candidates).
Sometimes we show that a result holds for both, the negative and the non-
negative case. We indicate this by 〈negative〉 in the problem name.
For all our hardness results we prove only NP-hardness for the corresponding
problems, but immediately obtain NP-completeness due to obvious membership
in NP for all of the problems.
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Table 1: Complexity results (P stands for solvability in polynomial time,
NP-c for NP-completeness) for variants of the destructive bribery problem
in CP-nets shown in this paper. These variants are specified by a cost
scheme (Cequal, Cflip, Clevel, Cany, Cdist), given at the top of the correspond-
ing column, and a voting scheme (SM,OP,OV,OKeff) at the beginning of the
corresponding row. The unweighted variants are given in the top half of the table,
the weighted ones are listed in the bottom half. The given results all hold for the
bribery actions IV , DV , and IV +DV , if not stated differently. The cases that
are solvable in polynomial time, if the entry in the cost vector is identical for every
voter, are not included.
Cequal Cflip Clevel Cany Cdist negative non-negative
u
n
w
ei
g
h
te
d
SM P P P P P Thm.2 Thm.2
OP IV NP-c NP-c NP-c NP-c NP-c Thm.3 Cor.4
DV NP-c NP-c NP-c NP-c NP-c Thm.3 Cor.4
IV +DV P NP-c NP-c NP-c NP-c Thm.5/3 Cor.6/4
OV P P P P P Thm.7 Thm.7
OKeff IV NP-c NP-c NP-c NP-c NP-c Thm.3 Cor.4
DV NP-c NP-c NP-c NP-c NP-c Thm.3 Cor.4
IV +DV P NP-c NP-c NP-c NP-c Thm.5/3 Cor.6/4
w
ei
g
h
te
d
SM NP-c NP-c NP-c NP-c NP-c Thm.10 Thm.10
OP NP-c NP-c NP-c NP-c NP-c Thm.8 Thm.8
OV IV NP-c NP-c NP-c NP-c NP-c Thm.9 Thm.9
DV NP-c NP-c NP-c NP-c P Thm.9/11 Thm.9/11
IV +DV NP-c NP-c NP-c NP-c NP-c Cor.9 Thm.9
OKeff NP-c NP-c NP-c NP-c NP-c Thm.8 Thm.8
Example Table 2 shows the CP-nets of the voters Alice (A), Bob (B), and
Charlie (C) over the three issues main dish, side dish, and drink with the domains
D(main) = {fish,meat}, D(side) = {rice, chips}, and D(drink) = {wine, beer} to
vote for a joined meal. Additionally, the individual orders of the issues are given
for each voter, implying the following total orders as expansions of the partial
orders defined by the CP-nets:
A: (fish,rice,wine) > (fish,chips,wine) > (fish,rice,beer) > (fish,chips,beer) . . .
B: (fish,chips,beer)> (fish,chips,wine) > (fish,rice,wine) > (fish,rice,beer) . . .
C: (fish,chips,beer)> (meat,chips,beer)> (fish,chips,wine)> (meat,chips,wine) . . .
Using the voting rule OK with k = 3, the candidate (fish,chips,wine) wins the
election, because it is the only one receiving a point from each of the three voters.
With the voting rule OP , the candidate (fish,chips,beer) is the winner, thanks to
the two points from Charlie and Bob. The same candidate wins with the voting
rule SM with respect to the order O : side > main > drink, for which the given
profile is O-legal. In the majority vote on the issue side, Bob and Charlie prefer
chips, so chips is chosen as a side dish. Because of this Charlie votes—like the
other two voters—for fish in the majority vote for the second issue of order O.
Finally Alice gets outvoted in the last issue, so the candidate (fish,chips,beer) is
the winner with the voting rule SM , too. With the voting rule OV , Alice casts
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Table 2: Example for three CP-nets of the voters Alice, Bob, and Charlie over
the three issues main dish, side dish, and drink with the domains D(main) =
{fish,meat}, D(side) = {rice, chips}, and D(drink) = {wine, beer}.
main side drink
Alice (A) fish > meat rice > chips meat : beer > wine
(main > drink > side) fish : wine > beer
Bob (B) fish > meat chips > rice meat, chips : beer > wine
(main > side > drink) meat, rice : beer > wine
fish, chips : beer > wine
fish, rice : wine > beer
Charlie (C) chips : fish > meat chips > rice chips : beer > wine
(side > drink > main) rice : meat > fish rice : wine > beer
her veto against (meat,chips,wine), Bob casts his veto against (meat,rice,wine),
and Charlie casts his veto against (fish,rice,beer). Therefore, the remaining five
candidates are the winning candidates with this rule. If a unique winner was
needed, a tie-breaking rule could be used.
If the briber wanted to prevent candidate h = (fish, chips, beer) from winning
with voting rule OP , it would be sufficient to bribe Bob to flip his preference in
issue side to rice > chips. This would make (fish,rice,wine) the top candidate of
Bob and, since Alice is voting for the very same candidate in the first place, the
winner of the election. So the briber can reach his goal by this bribery. Note that
this flip is only possible with the bribery action IV or IV +DV , because side is
an independent issue for Bob.
How much does the briber have to pay for this requested flip? For the cost
scheme Cany, this directly depends on the input, since each flip can have its own
costs. With Cflip, the cost factor is 1, since only one cp-statement has to be
flipped. With Clevel, it is 2 for this flip, because Bob’s CP-net has two levels and
the issue side is an independent one. The costs are the same for Cdist, because Bob
only prefers the candidates (fish,rice,beer) and (fish,chips,wine) to (fish,rice,wine).
Finally, with Cequal, bribing Bob has the same prize (assuming equal cost vector
entries) as bribing any other arbitrary voter with a different top candidate to
vote for (fish,rice,wine). To obtain the final costs the briber has to pay, each of
these values is then multiplied by the corresponding entry of the cost vector Q.
Therefore, the briber might sometimes be cheaper off to bribe a voter with a small
cost vector entry to flip a lot of cp-statements, than one with only a few flips
required but having a huge cost vector entry.
3 The unweighted case
In this section, we investigate the case where voters are unweighted.
Theorem 2. (SM,A,C)-〈negative〉-DB with bribery action A ∈ {IV,DV, IV +
DV } and cost scheme C ∈ {Cequal, Cany, Cflip, Clevel, Cdist} is solvable in poly-
nomial time.
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Proof. We start with the negative case. For each issue find the minimum costs to
spend for reaching a majority against h. This can be done by collecting all costs
for one issue, sorting and summing up. Finally the issue which is cheapest to bribe
is chosen. This works for each cost scheme for which it is easy to calculate the
bribery costs for a single flipped issue, which is the case for all cost schemes used
here3.
Note that depending on the allowed bribery action, not every voter may be
bribable in each issue. Similarly, we have to ignore voters who initially vote for h
but who do not vote for h any more after a bribery of the considered issue. These
voters have to be taken into account in the non-negative case, though. However,
this is the only modification needed for this case.
Theorem 3. (D,A,C)-negative-DB with D ∈ {OP,OKeff}, A ∈ {IV,DV },
C ∈ {Cequal, Cflip, Clevel, Cany, Cdist} is NP-complete. In addition, (D, IV +
DV,C ′)-negative-DB is NP-complete for C ′ ∈ {Cflip, Clevel, Cany, Cdist}. All
these results hold even if all entries in the cost vector are identical.
Proof. We give a base reduction from NAE-3SAT to prove Theorem 3. For this
reduction we claim that some properties hold, which we will then show to hold for
the various combinations of allowed bribery action, cost scheme and voting rule.
Assume we are given an NAE-3SAT instance with m clauses and n variables. For
each variable νi, we create one issue Xi. Since each issue has exactly two possible
assignments, we can establish a one-to-one relation between the full assignments
of the issues Xi and the one of the variables νi. For this relation we say the
assignment of xi to Xi corresponds to the assignment of 1 to variable νi. We will
later on—in the extensions of the base case—create additional gadget-issues.
For each clause γ with the variables νq, νr, νs and each of the six different sat-
isfying assignments to these variables for γ, we create one voter with the following
preferences: He prefers xi over xi for each issue with i /∈ {q, r, s}. For the remain-
ing three issues he prefers xl over xl, if 1 is assigned to variable νl in the satisfying
assignment of γ; he prefers xl over xl otherwise. For the considered clause with
variables νq, νr, νs, we obtain 6 voters which we refer to as qrs-voters. Doing this
for all clauses, we obtain 6m voters. Finally, we create m − 1 additional voters,
all having h as their top-candidate4. We set the entry in the cost vector for each
voter to 1.
We assume that the following property holds:
(i) No voter who is voting for h can be bribed to vote against h.
We further assume that for all other voters the following properties apply:
(ii) The preferences within issues associated with the clause the voter was created
for cannot be changed.
3This is most unintuitive for Cdist, but identifying the top candidate after bribing one issue
and determining the respective cost can be done in polynomial time as described by Mattei et
al. [19, Theorem 3].
4The candidate h can correspond to an arbitrary solution to the formula because Another-
SAT (the variant of SAT where, given a formula and a satisfying assignment for it, one has to
find another satisfying assignment for the formula) still is NP-complete, see for example [15].
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(iii) Changing the preferences within a gadget-issue does not help the briber.
(iv) The preferences within all remaining issues can be bribed freely.
Assuming that properties (i) to (iv) are fulfilled, it is easy to see that the bribery
instance can be solved if and only if the corresponding NAE-3SAT-formula is
satisfiable. Given a satisfying assignment to the formula, we can translate it to
the winning candidate by following the one-to-one relation. Since the assignment
satisfies each clause, the briber can bribe one of the six voters for each clause to
vote for the winning candidate (following (ii) and (iv)). Therefore this candidate
will have m votes in the end, while there are still only m−1 votes for h. The other
direction can be shown analogously with the help of property (iii).
We will now show the extensions to this base reduction to prove Theorem 3.
Property (i) is fulfilled because we are looking at the negative case.
(OP, IV,C): We need one gadget-issue X∗. Each voter is set to prefer x∗
over x∗. For each qrs-voter, the issues Xq,Xr,Xs are changed to depend on X
∗,
keeping their original preferences for x∗ and inverted preferences for x∗. Here we
utilize that NAE-3SAT is closed under complement, therefore the assignment of
X∗ is not important at all. This modification ensures the properties (ii)–(iv) to
hold for each cost scheme, since no costs are involved.
(OP,DV,C): Once again we need one gadget-issue X∗. Each voter is set to
prefer x∗ over x∗. Complementary to the case before, for each qrs-voter, each issue
Xi with i /∈ {q, r, s} is changed to depend on X
∗, keeping their original preferences
for x∗ and inverted preferences for x∗. This modification ensures the properties
(ii)–(iv) to hold for each cost scheme, since no costs are involved.
(OP, IV +DV,Cany): With IV +DV we need costs and an appropriate budget
to ensure that the issues Xq,Xr,Xs cannot be bribed for a qrs-voter. With Cany
we can simply set the costs to bribe these issues to 1, and for each remaining issue
to 0. With the budget set to β = 0 this ensures the properties (ii)–(iv) hold.
(OP, IV +DV,Cflip): We need to add m
2(n−3) gadget-issues, which we denote
as X∗a,b with 1 ≤ a ≤ m and 1 ≤ b ≤ m(n − 3). For each qrs-voter, each gadget-
issue X∗j,b with 1 ≤ b ≤ m(n− 3) depends on the issues Xq,Xr,Xs corresponding
to the variables of the clause γj . With the most preferred assignment in these
three issues the preference in the gadget-issue is set to x∗j,b > x
∗
j,b, and for each
other assignment to x∗j,b > x
∗
j,b. Finally we set the budget to β = m(n− 3). This
ensures the properties (ii)–(iv) to hold.
(OP, IV +DV,Clevel): We need mn gadget-issues X
∗
b for b ∈ {1, . . . ,mn}. In
contrast to Cflip, these issues do not depend on the issues Xq,Xr,Xs correspond-
ing to the variables of the clause γj in parallel, but in a queue. So X
∗
1 depends
on the issues Xq,Xr,Xs for a qrs-voter. Only for the most preferred assignment
within these three issues we set the preference of issue X∗1 to x
∗
1 > x
∗
1; in all other
cases we set it to x∗1 > x
∗
1. For each subsequent issue X
∗
b of this queue with
2 ≤ b ≤ mn, we set the preferences x∗b−1 : x
∗
b > x
∗
b and x
∗
b−1 : x
∗
b > x
∗
b . In addition,
for all issues Xi with i ∈ {1, . . . , n}\{q, r, s}, we set x
∗
mn
: xi > xi and else xi > xi.
Finally we set the budget to β = m(n− 3). This ensures the properties (ii)–(iv).
(OP, IV +DV,Cdist): We add ⌈logm⌉+ 1 gadget-issues, denoted by X
∗
a . Ev-
ery voter prefers x∗a > x
∗
a for each such issue. For each voter we set the (not
necessarily identical) order as follows. The most important issues are the three
10
issues corresponding to the variables of the clause γj associated with it, followed
by the gadget-issues, and then by the remaining n − 3 issues. The exact order
within these three blocks is not important. We set the budget to β = m · 2n−3− 1.
This ensures that the briber can bribe all of the least important n− 3 issues for m
voters, while the budget is still too low to bribe even only one of the three most
important issues of just one voter. Note that bribing such an issue costs at least
2n−3+⌈logm⌉ > β. Therefore the properties (ii)–(iv) hold.
Since OP is the special case of OKeff with k = 1, the NP-completeness results
shown so far carry over to OKeff.
We can achieve the same results for the non-negative cases, but for this we
have to drop the constraint that these problems are NP-complete even if the cost
vector contains only identical values.
Corollary 4. (D,A,C)-DB is NP-complete for each combination of a voting rule
D ∈ {OP,OKeff}, a cost scheme C ∈ {Cequal, Cflip, Clevel, Cany, Cdist} and a
bribery action A ∈ {IV,DV }. Moreover, (D, IV +DV,C ′)-DB with cost scheme
C ′ ∈ {Cflip, Clevel, Cany, Cdist} is NP-complete, too.
Proof. This follows by the same techniques used in the proof of Theorem 3. The
only difference is that property (i) is not automatically satisfied. We can achieve
unbribability of the voters voting for h by setting the entries of the cost vector for
these voters to β + 1. Therefore, NP-completeness follows.
For the two remaining cases of OP and OKeff, we will show solvability in
polynomial time.
Theorem 5. (D, IV +DV,Cequal)-negative-DB is solvable in polynomial time
with D ∈ {OP,OKeff}.
Proof. We partition the set of voters V into the set Vh of voters casting a vote to
h and the remaining voters V \ Vh.
Let us start with the voting rule OKeff and the case that k is polynomial in n
and m (denoted by poly(n,m)). For this we show that the set of candidates who
can be made a winner without exceeding the budget, is small enough to try out
each of them. Since the voters in Vh can only be bribed in the least important
⌈log k⌉ issues, the number of candidates these voters can be bribed to vote for is
2⌈log k⌉ = poly(n,m). Each of these we handle as a potential winning candidate.
Because the voters of V \ Vh can be bribed to vote for any of the exponentially
many candidates (IV + DV ) for the same costs (Cequal) it is sufficient to take
only those candidates into consideration who initially get at least one vote by a
voter of V \Vh. Since there are at most kn such candidates, we can handle them as
potential winning candidates, too. For each of the only poly(n,m) many potential
winning candidates, we calculate the bribing costs for each voter to vote for this
candidate, we sort them accorting to the costs, and add the bribing costs for as
many voters as needed (taking the cheapest ones first). Each of these steps can
be done in polynomial time in n and m, implying an overall polynomial running
time.
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The remaining case of OKeff – with k being a power of 2 and a global order
over the issues for all voters given – coincide with OP when the least important
log k issues are removed. This is due to the fact that a bribery of any subset
of those least log k issues for any voter only permutes the set of candidates this
voter votes for. We can solve this again by identifying the potential winners and
calculating the costs for the required bribery. Since with OP every voter votes just
for one candidate, there are only up to n such potential winning candidates. The
bribery costs for letting them win the election can be calculated by the algorithm
introduced by Dorn and Krüger [7, Theorem 10] for solving the constructive case
in polynomial time.
The non-negative case can be solved by a very similar algorithm.
Corollary 6. (D, IV +DV,Cequal)-DB is solvable in polynomial time with D ∈
{OP,OKeff}.
Proof. Corollary 6 can be shown by small adjustments to the proof of Theorem 5,
where the analogous negative cases are covered. For voting rule OKeff and the
case that k is polynomial in n and m, the briber is now able to bribe the voters in
Vh freely, therefore we have to build a second similar bribery-costs-sorted list of
voters in Vh. Summing up the cheapest of those costs to make a specific candidate
a winner of the election is a bit more complicated, since a bribery of a voter in
Vh could change this voter to not vote for h any longer. But this can be handeled
in time poly(n,m) easily. As potential winning candidates we try again each
candidate which did get at least one vote initially and additionally we try the
candidate which has a complementary assignment to h in each issue, because each
voter can be bribed to vote for him but not for h.
The remaining case of OKeff – with k being a power of 2 and a global order over
the issues for all voters given – coincides with OP again and the same arguments
as used in the proof of Theorem 5 can be used. This time we can use the result of
Mattei et al. [19, Theorem 8] for solving the constructive, non-negative case.
Interestingly, the voting rule OV is another special case of OK which can be
evaluated and solved in polynomial time.
Theorem 7. (OV,A,C)-〈negative〉-DB with bribery action A ∈ {IV,DV, IV +
DV } and cost scheme C ∈ {Cequal, Cflip, Clevel, Cany, Cdist} is in P.
Proof. To solve the negative version we distinguish two cases. First, in the case
n < 2m there has to be at least one candidate who did not obtain a veto, by the
pigeonhole principle. If h gets at least one veto, it is a yes-instance. Otherwise it
would be sufficient to bribe the cheapest voter to cast his veto to h. But as this
is not allowed, it is a no-instance.
Second, if n ≥ 2m, the number of candidates is linear in the input size, so one
can calculate the costs to let a candidate win for each candidate by applying the
polynomial-time algorithm by Dorn and Krüger [7, Theorem 12] for the construc-
tive negative (OV,A,C)-Bribery case which is formulated for the co-winner case
but can easily be adapted for the unique-winner case. The bribery with overall
minimum costs can then be applied if the budget is sufficient.
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The different bribery actions can just prevent the briber to bribe specific voters
in some issues, therefore the theorem holds for each bribery action. For the non-
negative version, we note that in the first case with n < 2m, it is now sufficient
(and possible) to bribe the cheapest voter to cast his veto against h. The rest
remains the same.
Due to space constraints we omit further examples of special cases of OKeff
which are solvable in polynomial time. We just remark that the combinations of
OP , IV +DV , and Cflip, Clevel, Cdist, and OP, IV,Cflip, each for the unweighted,
non-negative case and if all entries of the cost vector are the same, can be solved
in polynomial time, too (see Section 5). This is in line with the observations of
Mattei et al. [19, Theorem 7] and Dorn and Krüger [7, Theorem 7] that sometimes
the bribery problem can be solved in polynomial time when the cost vector has
only identical entries.
4 The weighted case
In this section, we consider the case of weighted voters, which turns out to be
NP-complete for almost all combinations—with two exceptions. The reductions
we give here are all from the Knapsack problem.
Theorem 8. weighted-(D,A,C)-〈negative〉-DB is NP-complete with voting
rule D ∈ {OP,OKeff}, bribery action A ∈ {IV,DV, IV +DV }, and cost scheme
C ∈ {Cequal, Cflip, Clevel, Cany, Cdist}.
Proof. For the voting rule OP , we use a reduction from Knapsack. Given a
Knapsack instance ({(w1, v1), . . . , (wn, vn)}, k, b) we construct a voting scheme
such that a successful bribery against the candidate h is possible if and only if the
given Knapsack problem can be solved.
First, we use two issues X1 and X2, set h = x1 x2, and the budget β = b. We
create one voter preferring h with weight l+ k− 1, where l =
∑n
i=1 vi. We set the
entry of the cost vector for this voter to β + 1 in order to make him unbribable
(just to make this proof hold for the non-negative case, too).
For every object (wi, vi) we add a voter preferring x1x2 to all other candidates.
This voter is weighted by vi and his entry in the cost vector is set to wi. Last, we
add a single voter of weight l preferring x1x2 to all other candidates. Since this
candidate should win the election, we make this voter unbribable by setting the
entry in the cost vector to β + 1.
For the bribery actions IV and IV +DV all issues are independent. For the
bribery action DV we let the preferences of the issue X2 depend on the assignment
of issue X1 for each voter created for an object (wi, vi). Such a voter will therefore
prefer x1 independently over x1, and the preference for X2 will be x1 : x2 >
x2, x1 : x2 > x2.
By construction, only voters created for objects can be bribed, and only chang-
ing their favorite candidate to x1x2 is helpful here. Each bribery of one such voter
results in a value of 1 for each cost scheme, which is then multiplied by the entry
of the cost vector. Note that a cost of 1 is obvious in all cases except Cdist. Here,
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we have to ensure that the target of our bribery is on the second position. As the
prefered candidate is x1x2 and our potential winner is x1x2, we have to set X1
before X2 in the order on the issues. The claimed cost of 1 for this bribery action
then holds. It is easy to see that there must exist a solution to the underlying
Knapsack instance in order to be able to prohibit the candidate h from winning.
Since the briber cannot bribe the single voter voting for h by construction,
this reduction holds for the negative case as well. Because OP is a special case of
OKeff, this result automatically carries over.
The main idea of this reduction can be adjusted to show NP-completeness for
the voting rules OV and SM , too.
Theorem 9. weighted-(OV,A,C)-〈negative〉-DB with a bribery action A ∈
{IV,DV, IV + DV } and cost scheme C ∈ {Cequal, Cflip, Clevel, Cany, Cdist} is
NP-complete, except for the combination A = DV and C = Cdist.
Proof. We prove Theorem 9 in a similar manner as Theorem 8 by reduction from
Knapsack. Let us start with the non-negative case. For this we again need the
two issues X1 and X2, declare candidate x1 x2 to be the disliked candidate h, and
set the budget to β = b. Let us start with the allowed bribery action IV . First
we create 2 voters, weighted by 2l with l =
∑n
i=1 vi. One of them is casting his
veto to candidate x1x2, the other one to x1x2. Furthermore we create one voter
weighted by l casting his veto to c∗ = x1x2 and a last one of this kind weighted by
2l − 2k + 1 vetoing for h. We fix all these four voters by setting their cost vector
entry to β + 1; this makes the dependencies of their issues unimportant.
Finally we create one voter for each object (wi, vi) casting his veto to c
∗ with
weight vi and set the entry of the cost vector for this voter to wi. Since the briber
can only bribe these object-voters, his only change consists in bribing voters with
a total weight of at least k to cast their veto to h instead of to c∗. By doing so, c∗
will win with a score of 2l− k, while h will have a score of 2l− k+1, and the last
two candidates 2l, each. Each such bribery will have a cost value of 1 for the cost
schemes Cequal, Cflip, Clevel, Cdist, and for Cany we can simply set the costs for
the required flip to 1. Together with the entries from the cost vector, a successful
bribery can only be found within the given budget if and only if there exists a
solution to the underlying Knapsack instance.
Since there are no dependencies between the issues of the voters, this construction
works for the bribery action IV + DV , too. For DV we need to make some
adjustments. Here we swap the role of the candidates x1x2 and x1x2 and change
the voters accordingly. The voters created for the objects (wi, vi) have to be
changed further, though. We set the preferences over issue X1 to be independent
to x1 > x1 and for issue X2 to x1 : x2 > x2, x1 : x2 > x2. The weight and the
entry in the cost vector of such a voter remain vi and wi, respectively. From here
on, one can show the reduction by the same argumentation as before.
This result can be deduced to the negative case by just some small adjustments
of the weights of the unbribable voters. The only voter vetoing h needs a weight
of l−k+1, the unbribable voters vetoing c∗ are not needed any more, and the last
two such voters vetoing the last two candidates need their weights to be lowered
to l. So the briber has to bribe the voters casting their veto to one of the two
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latter candidates instead of c∗ (since changing them to h is not allowed) to make
c∗ the winner instead of h.
Theorem 10. weighted-(SM,A,C)-〈negative〉-DB is NP-complete for cost
scheme C ∈ {Cequal, Cflip, Clevel, Cany, Cdist} and allowed bribery action A ∈
{IV,DV, IV +DV }.
Proof. We prove Theorem 10 by reduction from Knapsack. For this we again
need the two issues X1 and X2, declare candidate x1 x2 to be the disliked can-
didate h, and set the budget to β = b. We create a single voter preferring h,
weighted by 2l, with l =
∑n
i=1 vi. We set the entry of the cost vector for this
voter to 2β + 1 in order to make him unbribable (to make this proof hold for the
non-negative case, too). We create one similar voter, weighted by 2l, and a cost
vector entry of 2β + 1, who prefers x1x2.
Because of the sequential fixing of assignments to the issues we swap the roles
of the candidates x1x2 and x1x2. So for every object (wi, vi), we add a voter
preferring x1x2. This voter is weighted by vi and his entry in the cost vector is
set to wi. We create one additional voter preferring x1x2, weighted by l and with
a cost vector entry of 2β + 1. Last, we add a single voter of weight 2l − 2k + 1
preferring x1x2 and make this voter unbribable by setting the entry in the cost
vector to 2β + 1.
For the bribery actions IV and IV +DV , all issues are independent. For the
bribery action DV , we need to make the preferences of the issue X2 depending
on the assignment of issue X1 for each voter created for an object (wi, vi). Such
a voter will therefore prefer x1 independently over x1, and the preference for X2
will be x1 : x2 > x2, x1 : x2 > x2. In both variants we set the issue X1 to be the
leading one in the order O needed to evaluate the voting rule SM .
Again, the briber can only bribe those voters who were created for objects, and
only changing their cp-statement x1 : x2 > x2 to x1 : x2 > x2 is helping here. Each
bribery of one such voter will result in a value of 1 for almost each cost scheme,
which is then multiplied by the entry of the cost vector. The only exception is
the cost scheme Cdist, where such a change would be free. For this combination
of cost scheme and bribery action we need a modification we will discuss later.
This leads to the following votes in the sequential voting of SM . Note that
the assignment of X1 is fixed to the winner of the first round to all voters.
without bribery with bribery of total weight ϕ
x1 4l − 2k + 1 4l − 2k + 1
x1 4l 4l
x2 4l − 2k + 1 4l − 2k + 1 + ϕ
x2 4l 4l − ϕ
So only with a bribery of voters with a total weight ϕ ≥ k, the candidate x1x2
will win the election. In every other case the candidate h = x1 x2 wins. It is
easy to see that this establishes the equivalence of Knapsack and Weighted-
(SM,A,C)-DB.
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For the combination of Cdist and DV we need to introduce a new issue X3.
For each voter with a cost vector entry of 2β + 1, we add the independent cp-
statement x3 > x3; for all the other voters (created for an object) we add the
independent cp-statement x3 > x3 and change the preference for X1 to x1 > x1.
The needed order O over the issues is extended to X1 > X2 > X3. The candi-
date x1 x2 x3 serves as the disliked candidate h, and, since the broad majority of
the voters votes for x3 over x3, he wins the unbribed election. To prevent this, the
briber can, again, only bribe an appropriate subsets of voters—all created for an
object—to flip the cp-statement x1 : x2 > x2. This will rise the candidate x1x2x3
from the third to the top position for those voters, resulting in a total cost of 2 ·wi
to bribe such a voter vi. Because of this factor of 2 we need to double the budget,
too. If there is a solution to the corresponding instance of Knapsack, there exists
a bribery letting candidate x1x2x3 win the election.
By this modification, we ensure, apart from introducing costs to the needed
bribery, that, again, no voter initially voting for h can be bribed. Therefore this
reduction holds for the negative case as well.
In contrast, the combination of OV with Cdist can be solved in polynomial
time by a greedy-algorithm because all possible bribery actions are for free.
Theorem 11. weighted-(OV,DV,Cdist)-〈negative〉-DB is solvable in polyno-
mial time.
Proof. Consider an instance of weighted-(OV,DV,Cdist)-negative-DB. We
distinguish two cases. (1) If the disliked candidate h does not get a single veto, he
cannot be prevented from winning at all. (2) Otherwise, he gets at least one veto.
This case can be subdivided into two sub-cases: (2.1) If there is a candidate with-
out any vetos, there is nothing to do, because h is not a winner. (2.2) But if every
candidate gets at least one veto, we might be able to prevent h from winning. Note
that in this case there cannot be more candidates than voters, so n ≥ 2m must
hold. Therefore we can try to make each of the candidates a winner. This can
easily be done by bribing as many voters to cast their veto against h as possible.
After that we try for each candidate (except h) to take as many vetos from this
candidate as possible. Since we are only allowed to bribe dependent issues, this
will involve no costs with the cost scheme Cdist, because each voter can only be
bribed such that the top candidate remains the same. This is due to the fact that
one cp-statement of each dependent issue is needed to evaluate the top candidate
and another cp-statement is used to determine the least favorite candidate (who
will get the veto). So just flipping the latter will result in a different candidate
getting the veto, but will preserve the top candidate. Note that it is possible to
bribe a voter in more than just one dependent issue, but in our case it is not
necessary.
This procedure can be used to solve the non-negative case, too. We only
need to bribe as many voters as possible to cast their veto against h. This again
involves no costs, and after this preprocessing we can apply the same procedure
as above.
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5 Special Cases: Setting each entry in the cost vector
to the same value.
First we argue that if the cost vector does not distinguish different voters and sets
each cost to a, we can assume each entry to be 1. This is obviously true as we
can just divide the budget and each entry of the cost vector by a which forces us
to round all values. It is easy to see that this does not change the instance as we
can not spend the budget we lose through rounding. Even a single bribery is more
expensive than the budget we lose.
Theorem 12. (OP,A,Cflip)-destructive-Bribery is in P with bribery action
A ∈ {IV, IV +DV }, if the cost vector assigns the same value to each voter.
Proof. For the bribery actions IV and IV +DV , each voter can be bribed to vote
for at least one different candidate with a cost of 1. Note that it is never helping
the briber to bribe a voter for more than cost 1, because for this cost he can always
decrease the score of h by one and/or increase the score of the designated winner.
Moreover, existence of a successful bribery is equivalent to existence of a successful
bribery which has a cost of 1 per voter and where voters are only asked not to
vote for h.
There are at most n ·m different candidates the briber can bribe voters to vote
for. Since they are easy to identify one can calculate for every such candidate the
costs to let this candidate win by just bribing voters to vote to him or/and to some
arbitrary other candidate instead of h. The cheapest such bribery is the solution
if the budget is sufficient, otherwise there exists none.
Corollary 13. (OP, IV +DV,Cdist)-destructive-Bribery is in P if the cost
vector assigns the same value to each voter.
Proof. The same argument used in Theorem 12 holds here. There is always exactly
one candidate the briber can bribe a voter to vote for instead of h with costs 1
(by bribing the least important issue).
Corollary 14. (OP, IV +DV,Clevel)-destructive-Bribery is in P if the cost
vector assigns the same value to each voter.
Proof. Again, the same argument used in Theorem 12 holds. There is always at
least one candidate the briber can bribe a voter to vote for instead of h with costs 1
(this will be a depending issue as long as the voter does not only have independent
issues).
Theorem 15. (OKeff, IV + DV,Cflip)-destructive-Bribery is in P for O-
legal profiles if the cost vector assigns the same value to each voter.
Proof. Let x1x2 . . . xm−1xm be the disliked candidate h and c
∗ denote the candi-
date x1x2 . . . xm−1, xm. In every instance the score of h is greater than the score
of c∗, therefore there has to be at least one voter having h but not c∗ among his
first k preferred candidates. This can happen if and only if the rank of h in this
voter’s induced preference order over all candidates is k, and the rank of c∗ is k+1.
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For each of these voters the briber needs to bribe just one flip on the last issue to
reduce the score of h and, simultaneously, increase the score of c∗ by one. Note
that there is no candidate ci 6= c
∗ with s(ci) ≤ ⌊
s(h)
2 ⌋, which can be made a winner
with less flips than c∗. Therefore it is sufficient to calculate the costs to make c∗
or any candidate cj , with initially s(cj) > ⌊
s(h)
2 ⌋, win the election. The cheapest
such bribery is the solution, if the budget is sufficient. Since there are at most n
candidates to check, each by iterating over n voters with m issues, this results in
a running-time in O(n2 ·m).
Theorem 16. (OKeff, IV,Cflip)-destructive-Bribery is in P if the cost vector
assigns the same value to each voter.
Proof. If k is polynomial in n and m, each voter initially voting for h can be
bribed to not vote for h by just flipping one issue. This can be the most important
one, but some other issue as well. However, the most important one is always an
independent issue and therefore bribable. So it is sufficient to bribe just voters
initially voting for h with exactly one flip. There are at most m · k candidates
which can get an additional vote from one voter, so at most m · k · n candidates
can beat h after the bribery (plus possibly the candidate with the second most
number of votes before the bribery).
Note that it is not necessary to try each of those candidates to win. Just track
for each such candidate how many voters voting for h can be bribed to vote for
him with only one flip. One can do so by iterating over the voter voting for h and
increasing a counter for each candidate the voter can be bribed to vote for by only
one flip. Let ai be the number of such voters who can be bribed to vote for the
candidate ci. If there is a candidate with s(h) < s(ci)+ ai+β, this candidate can
be made a winner by bribing ai voters to vote for ci but not for h and additional
β − ai voters not to vote for h. If there is no such voter, it is a no-instance.
Theorem 17. (OKeff, IV + DV,Cdist)-destructive-Bribery is in P for O-
legal profiles if the cost vector assigns the same value to each voter.
Proof. We prove Theorem 17 with a similar idea as in the proof of Theorem 15.
First we preprocess the instance: whenever a voter voting for h is given who can
be bribed no to vote for h without costs, we bribe him in this way, as this is never
wrong. Note that this can be done efficiently, because there are at most l = ⌈log k⌉
many issues that may be considered for this, so even a brute-force approach would
be doable in polynomial time.
Let the candidate x1x2 . . . xm−1xm be denoted by c
∗, whereas the disliked
candidate h is x1x2 . . . xm−1xm. In every instance the score of h is greater than
the score of c∗, therefore there has to be at least one voter ranking h but not c∗
among his first k preferred candidates. This can happen if and only if h is on
rank k and c∗ on rank k+1. For each of these voters the briber needs to bribe just
one flip on the last issue to reduce the score of h and, simultaneously, increase the
score of c∗ by one. This flip will always result in a change of the top candidate,
which would imply a cost of 1, because the top two candidates will swap their
position.
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Note that, depending on k, one might change the score of certain candidates
without spending budget, because the top candidate stays the same. This can
only happen due to flips in the last l issues, and there only with dependent ones.
Therefore there are at most n · 2l such candidates, whose scores can be raised
without both paying anything and raising the score of h. Let smax(ci) denote the
maximum score the candidate ci can reach by such a bribery.
There is no candidate ci 6= c
∗ with smax(ci) ≤ ⌊
s(h)
2 ⌋ which can be made a
winner with less costs than c∗. Therefore it is sufficient to calculate the costs to
make c∗ or any candidate cj, with initially smax(cj) > ⌊
s(h)
2 ⌋, win the election. The
cheapest such bribery is the solution, if the budget is sufficient. Since there are
less than n · (2l +1) candidates ci with smax(cj) > 0, there are at most n · (2
l +1)
candidates to check, each by iterating over n voters with m issues, resulting in a
running-time in O(n2 · (2l + 1) ·m).
Comment. O-legality of the profile is needed for Lemma 17, because otherwise
there is not necessarily a unique c∗ which is next to h in the order of candidates
for each voter.
Theorem 18. (OKeff, A,Cflip)-destructive-Bribery is in P with bribery ac-
tion A ∈ {IV, IV +DV } for O-legal profiles and k being a power of 2, if the cost
vector assigns the same value to each voter.
Proof. With k = 2j it is never helping the briber to bribe one of the last j issues.
Therefore a successful bribery makes a candidate win that differs from h in at
least one of the first m − j issues. Such a candidate can be found in polynomial
running-time with the algorithm given in the proof of Theorem 12, from the voting
protocol OP .
Theorem 19. (OKeff, IV +DV,Cdist)-destructive-Bribery is in P, when k
is a power of 2, if the cost vector assigns the same value to each voter.
Proof. With k = 2j it is never helping the briber to bribe one of the last j issues.
So the cheapest reasonable issue to bribe is issue Xm−j . With Cdist the next best
issue would be issue Xm−j−1, but this will cost twice as much. Therefore the best
strategy is to bribe voters initially voting for h only in issue Xm−j until h loses
against some other candidate or until the budget is not sufficient anymore. Note
that the voters cannot be chosen at random, but it can be easily checked which
one should be started with.
6 Conclusion
We extensively studied destructive bribery for the weighted, unweighted, negative
and non-negative variations on all cost-, bribery- and evaluation-schemes intro-
duced by Mattei et al. [19]. Table 1 summarizes our results. The main differences
can be observed between the weighted and unweighted cases, while the negative
and non-negative cases are very similar—we remark that these cases may behave
differently, however, if the cost vector assigns the same value to each of the voters.
The cost vector is also the tool to mimic the restriction of the negative setting in
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the non-negative case: with its help, one can make a voter unbribable (one cannot
use it to affect the bribery actions though).
It is also interesting to observe that—for an arbitrary cost vector—all combi-
nations in the weighted case for the constructive bribery problem turned out to
be NP-complete [7], whereas in the destructive setting, we have identified two
tractable cases. They occur due to the strange side effect of the combination of
DV and Cdist that sets all reasonable bribery free of charge.
The most interesting observation might be that in the unweighted setting, only
the combination of SM and Cequal was shown to be NP-complete for construc-
tive bribery [19, 7], while almost half of the combinations for destructive bribery
turned out to be computationally hard - this behavior is rather unusual for voting
problems and is due to the combinatorial structure of the set of candidates. If
the number of candidates is part of the input (which is the case for many of the
common settings for voting problems), the constructive case of a voting problem
can be directly used to solve the destructive counterpart: If it is known how to
make a designated candidate the only winner of the election, one can simply run
this procedure for all candidates and find out which of them is the cheapest solu-
tion. In the setting of combinatorial domains where the number of candidates is
exponential in the size of the input, one cannot simply check which of the expo-
nentially many candidates should be chosen to be made the winner. It might turn
out, nevertheless, that the destructive version is not computationally harder, but
in our case, we have seen that precluding an alternative might be more difficult
than pushing it through.
References
[1] Craig Boutilier, Ronen I. Brafman, Carmel Domshlak, Holger H. Hoos, and
David Poole. Cp-nets: A Tool for Representing and Reasoning with Condi-
tional Ceteris Paribus Preference Statements. J. Artif. Intell. Res., 21:135–
191, 2004.
[2] Ronen Brafman, Francesca Rossi, Domenico Salvagnin, Kristen Brent Ven-
able, and Toby Walsh. Finding the Next Solution in Constraint- and
Preference-Based Knowledge Representation Formalisms. In Principles of
Knowledge Representation and Reasoning: Proceedings of the 12th Interna-
tional Conference, pages 425–433. AAAI Press, 2010.
[3] Felix Brandt, Vincent Conitzer, and Ulle Endriss. Computational Social
Choice. In Multiagent Systems, pages 213–283. MIT Press, 2013.
[4] Vincent Conitzer, Jérôme Lang, and Tuomas Sandholm. How many candi-
dates are needed to make elections hard to manipulate? In Proc. of the
9th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge, pages
201–214. ACM, 2003.
[5] Vincent Conitzer, Jérôme Lang, and Lirong Xia. Hypercubewise Preference
Aggregation in Multi-Issue Domains. In Proceedings of the 22nd International
Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, pages 158–163. AAAI Press, 2011.
20
[6] Vincent Conitzer and Tuomas Sandholm. Complexity of Manipulating Elec-
tions with Few Candidates. In Proc. of the 18th National Conference on
Artificial Intelligence, pages 314–319. AAAI Press, 2002.
[7] Britta Dorn and Dominikus Krüger. On the hardness of bribery variants
in voting with CP-nets. Ann. of Math. Artif. Intell., pages 1–29, 2015. to
appear.
[8] E. Elkind, P. Faliszewski, and A. Slinko. Swap bribery. Algorithmic Game
Theory, pages 299–310, 2009.
[9] P. Faliszewski, L. Hemaspaandra, E. Hemaspaandra, , and J. Rothe. A Richer
Understanding of the Complexity of Election Systems. In Fundamental Prob-
lems in Computing: Essays in Honor of Professor Daniel J. Rosenkrantz,
chapter 14, pages 375–406. Springer, 1 edition, 2009.
[10] Piotr Faliszewski. Nonuniform Bribery. In Proceedings of the 7th International
Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, volume 3,
pages 1569–1572. IFAAMAS, 2008.
[11] Piotr Faliszewski, Edith Hemaspaandra, and Lane A. Hemaspaandra. How
Hard Is Bribery in Elections? J. Artif. Intell. Res., 35(2):485–532, 2009.
[12] Piotr Faliszewski, Edith Hemaspaandra, Lane A. Hemaspaandra, and Jörg
Rothe. Llull and Copeland Voting Computationally Resist Bribery and Con-
structive Control. J. Artif. Intell. Res. (JAIR), 35:275–341, 2009.
[13] M. R. Garey and David S. Johnson. Computers and Intractability: A Guide
to the Theory of NP-Completeness. W. H. Freeman, 1979.
[14] Edith Hemaspaandra, Lane A. Hemaspaandra, and Jörg Rothe. Anyone but
him: The complexity of precluding an alternative. Artif. Intell., 171(5-6):255–
285, 2007.
[15] Laurent Juban. Dichotomy theorem for the generalized unique satisfiability
problem. In Fundamentals of Computation Theory, volume 1684 of LNCS,
pages 327–337. Springer, 1999.
[16] Jérôme Lang. Vote and Aggregation in Combinatorial Domains with Struc-
tured Preferences. In Proc. of the 20th International Joint Conference on
Artificial Intelligence, pages 1366–1371, 2007.
[17] Thomas R. Magrino, Ronald L. Rivest, and Emily Shen. Computing the Mar-
gin of Victory in IRV Elections. In 2011 Electronic Voting Technology Work-
shop / Workshop on Trustworthy Elections, EVT/WOTE ’11, San Francisco,
CA, USA, August 8-9, 2011. USENIX Association, 2011.
[18] Alberto Maran, Nicolas Maudet, Maria Silvia Pini, Francesca Rossi, and Kris-
ten Brent Venable. A Framework for Aggregating Influenced CP-Nets and
Its Resistance to Bribery. In Proceedings of the 27th AAAI Conference on
Artificial Intelligence, pages 668–674. AAAI Press, 2013.
21
[19] Nicholas Mattei, Maria Silvia Pini, Francesca Rossi, and Kristen Brent Ven-
able. Bribery in voting with CP-nets. Ann. Math. Artif. Intell., 68(1-3):135–
160, 2013.
[20] Lawrence Norden, Aaron Burstein, Joseph Lorenzo Hall, and Margaret Chen.
Post-election audits: restoring trust in elections. Technical report, Brennan
Center for Justice at New York University, 2007.
[21] M.S. Pini, F. Rossi, and K.B. Venable. Bribery in Voting With Soft Con-
straints. In Proceedings of the 27th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelli-
gence, pages 803–809. AAAI Press, 2013.
[22] Keith Purrington and Edmund H. Durfee. Making Social Choices from Indi-
viduals’ CP-nets. In Proceedings of the 6th International Joint Conference on
Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, pages 1122–1124. IFAAMAS,
2007.
[23] Yannick Reisch, Jörg Rothe, and Lena Schend. The Margin of Victory in
Schulze, Cup, and Copeland Elections: Complexity of the Regular and Exact
Variants. In STAIRS 2014 - Proceedings of the 7th European Starting AI
Researcher Symposium, pages 250–259. IOS Press, 2014.
[24] Francesca Rossi, Kristen Brent Venable, and Toby Walsh. mCP Nets: Repre-
senting and Reasoning with Preferences of Multiple Agents. In Proceedings of
the 19th National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, pages 729–734. AAAI
Press, 2004.
[25] Philip B. Stark. Risk-limiting post-election audits: P-values from common
probability inequalities. IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and
Security 4, pages 1005–1014, 2009.
[26] Lirong Xia. Computing the margin of victory for various voting rules. In
ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, EC ’12, Valencia, Spain, June
4-8, 2012, pages 982–999. ACM, 2012.
[27] Lirong Xia, Vincent Conitzer, and Jérôme Lang. Voting on Multiattribute
Domains with Cyclic Preferential Dependencies. In Proceedings of the 23rd
AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, pages 202–207. AAAI Press, 2008.
22
